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The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP):  The devil will be in the detail 
 
 Ian Wooton, University of Strathclyde 
 
Abstract 
The European Union and the United States of America are currently engaged in negotiations on a 
comprehensive  bilateral  trade  agreement,  known  as  the  Trans-Atlantic  Trade  and  Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). According to the European Commission (2015), the resulting bilateral agreement 
should ³KHOS people and businesses large and small, by: opening up the US to EU firms; helping cut red 
tape that firms face when exporting; setting new rules to make it easier and fairer to export, import and 
invest RYHUVHDV´ Despite these ideals, the proposed agreement and the negotiations to achieve it have 
been subject to criticism by many people and organisations across Europe. This article attempts to shed 
some light on the issues and the potential benefits (or otherwise) of TTIP with a particular focus on 
Scottish interests. 
I Introduction and background 
It may be helpful to provide some background to the current negotiations. The first question that might 
be asked is why the US and EU, both strong advocates of multilateral negotiations, have turned to these 
bilateral trade talks. 
Since the end of World War 2, barriers to international commerce have fallen dramatically across the 
globe. This has been achieved largely under the aegis of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its 
pre-1995 predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These institutions are 
multilateral in nature, such that that member states (currently numbering 161 countries) are required to 
give equal treatment to imports from all of the other members. Countries therefore set a single, ³0RVW- 
Favoured 1DWLRQ´ (MFN) tariff (import tax) on a product regardless of its source (though countries 
outside of the WTO can face less-favourable access). The major advantage of multilateralism in trade 
negotiations  is  that,  while  larger  countries  generally  focus  on  resolving  trade  issues  between 
themselves, the benefits of improved market access in the resulting trade deal are extended to smaller 
countries. These nations would probably not have the clout to wring similar concessions out of their big 
trading partners on their own. Consequently small countries may be the collateral damage if large 
countries switch from multilateral to bilateral trade negotiations. 
Bilateral trade talks are nothing new. Prior to the establishment of the GATT in 1948, trade talks would 
generally  occur  between  small  groups  of  countries.  Despite  the  benefits  of  engaging  in  trade 
negotiations at a global scale, the multilateral nature of the GATT left it unable to address political and 
economic conditions specific to some of its member countries. Thus, almost from its inception, the GATT 
had to accommodate special deals arranged amongst smaller groupings of nations. Article XXIV of the 
GATT permits free-trade agreements amongst its members, whereby groups of countries can offer 
preferential access to each RWKHU¶V markets with tariff rates less than their MFN rates.  Indeed, the strict  
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interpretation of Article XXIV is that the alternative to MFN is free trade and these bilateral tariffs should 
be zero. 
Article XXIV reconciles the trading regime within the EU with its membership of the WTO. The current 28 
member countries of the EU trade freely amongst themselves, with the MFN tariffs on imports only 
applying to goods from outwith the EU (although many of these exporters also enjoy preferential access 
thanks to the (8¶V participation in additional free-trade agreements). Equally, though more recently, the 
US has availed itself of Article XXIV, most notably in the establishment of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NATFA) which, though less comprehensive than European integration, allows goods 
manufactured by Canada, Mexico and the US to move across their borders without import tariffs. 
While deeper integration in Europe is motivated by much more than mere economics, many of the other 
bilateral deals, including NAFTA, were in part a result of the perception that the central mechanism 
driving trade liberalisation, GATT/WTO, was running out of steam. In a respect, the multilateral trading 
system is a victim of its own success. Average tariffs have declined quite sharply, while an increasing 
share of the ZRUOG¶V trade is accounted for by members of the WTO as their numbers have grown. In a 
respect, the earliest rounds of tariff-cutting addressed the ³ORZ-hanging IUXLW´ products for which 
increasing market access did not present any great domestic concerns or political controversy. However, 
eliminating trade barriers on remaining products and services might be more politically charged, with 
strong domestic lobbies opposing further trade liberalisation. This issue might have been easier to 
resolve had the expansion of membership of the WTO not have also increased the diversity of the 
member countries. The increasing numbers and influence of developing nations has raised issues that 
the older membership of industrialised countries did not have to address. The larger and more diverse 
the membership of the WTO, the harder it has become for it to reach agreement on new trade deals. 
Indeed, the current, Doha Round of multilateral negotiations has been stalled for several years with little 
hope of an imminent breakthrough. Consequently, it is little surprise that many countries have lost 
patience with the WTO and have decided to pursue free-trade deals with their biggest trading partners. 
II Bilateral trade agreements: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic 
Trade Investment Partnership (TTIP)  
The US is seeking to develop two major bilateral trade agreements on a grand scale. Not only is it in 
talks with the EU over TTIP but it has been engaged in negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) for much longer. Success with the TPP negotiations would result in a trade deal with eleven other 
countries on the Pacific Rim (Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, Japan plus 
Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile). In order to negotiate international trade agreements, the US President 
has to receive Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), more commonly referred to as Fast-Track negotiating 
authority, from the US Congress. This delegates to the executive branch of the US government the 
responsibility to negotiate trade deals  which are then presented to Congress for approval in their 
entirety, preventing them from being picked apart on the floor of the House of Representatives or the 
Senate. TPA expired in 2007 and trade negotiations have been conducted as is if it were in place but it 
will have to be renewed before either TPP or TTIP can be presented to Congress. 
The Obama administration has faced an uphill battle to get Congress to agree to a renewal and at the 
time of writing this is still in active debate in the US Congress. In part, this difficulty in getting renewed 
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TPA is a reflection of the concerns regarding the specific trade deals in the pipeline. These proposed 
deals go beyond the conventional trade issues of tariff rates and product standards and extend into the 
areas of labour laws, environmental laws, Intellectual property (IP), state-owned enterprises and 
government procurement. 
From a European perspective it is worth noting that commentators in the US view TPP as the more 
controversial of the two prospective trade deals. Thus, while TTIP is the focus of this article, it is worth 
noting briefly the opposition to TPP. The negotiations for TPP have been shrouded in secrecy (an 
accusation that has also been levelled at TTIP) but there have been a number of leaks that indicate 
where  some  of  the  opposition  lies.    These  include  objections  to:  Hollywood  studies  that  wish  to 
extend copyright protection to the life of the author plus 70 years; pharmaceutical companies that want 
to make it harder to introduce generic versions of brand-name drugs; and international investors who 
want better ways to challenge alleged government expropriation of their investments (Timothy Lee, 
2015). As Paul Krugman has said on TPP: ³7KLV is not a trade agreement. ,W¶V about intellectual 
property and dispute settlement; the big beneficiaries are likely to be pharma companies and firms that 
want to sue JRYHUQPHQWV´ (Paul Krugman, 2015). 
Given this damning assessment of TPP, does the same hold true for TTIP? One popular myth can be 
immediately disposed. The claims of secrecy levelled against TTIP are largely unsubstantiated. The 
European Commission maintains a comprehensive website on TTIP objectives and negotiations 
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/).  Hence, what  is  up  for  discussion  is  not  in  much 
doubt. The gains or losses from TTIP will arise from the specifics of the agreement. 
The remainder of this article will look at the current state-of±play as regards trade relations between the 
two economic giants, the prospects for further liberalisation and harmonisation, and the other aspects 
that might be included in a comprehensive trade deal.  
 
Table 1: Shares in world trade US, EU and TTIP (2013)  
Shares in world trade 2013 USA EU TTIP 
Goods trade    
Share of world exports 8.39% 25.19% 33.58% 
Share of world imports 12.33% 19.74% 32.07% 
Services trade    
Share of world exports 14.25% 15.33% 29.58% 
Share of world imports 9.85% 14.78% 24.63 
Source: WTO, stat.wto.org  
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Table 1 shows the importance of the US and the EU to the world economy. Collectively, the two 
contribute around one third of global trade in goods and around one quarter of trade in commercial 
services. 
Not surprisingly, both the US and EU are very important trading partners to each other, even before any 
bilateral agreement is reached. This is shown in Table 2. From the perspective of the USA, the EU is its 
2nd-most important source of  imports  and  destination  for  exports.  The  USA  is  the  most  important 
market for EU exports and is the (8¶V 3rd largest source of imports.
 
Table 2: Bilateral goods trade, EU and US imports / exports, by rank and % share, 2013 
Bilateral goods trade 2013 Ranking Share 
Ranking as export destination   
EU exports for US  2 16.7% 
US exports for EU 1 16.4% 
Ranking as import origin   
EU imports for US  2 17.0% 
US imports for EU 3 11.6% 
Source: WTO, stat.wto.org  
 
III TTIP - Trade in Goods 
Given that the US and many of the constituent countries of the EU have engaged in every round of the 
GATT multilateral negotiations, their MFN tariffs have already been driven to low levels. Looking at the 
trade-weighted tariffs (averages based upon the volumes of trade in the products imported), the US 
imposes an average tariff of 2.1% and the corresponding average tariff of the EU is 2.6%. While the 
trading partners have good access to each RWKHU¶V market, there is room for further bilateral trade 
liberalisation that could have important effects for producers and consumers.  The difficulty in looking at 
average tariffs is that they can mask high import taxes on individual products, so there may be some 
industries for which trade liberalisation under TTIP may have significant effects. 
For many sectors of the economy, TTIP will have no direct impact. Over half of the goods traded 
between the US and the EU are freely traded with no tariffs. This is the case for 6FRWODQG¶V most famous 
export to the US, whisky. The US has an MFN tariff on whiskies of zero, so TTIP will not improve 
GLVWLOOHUV¶ market access. 
The tariffs are higher between the US and EU for some traditional manufactures. Both have high 
average  tariffs  on  Clothing:  the  US  charging  11.6%  and  the  EU  11.5%.  Consequently,  trade 
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liberalisation under TTIP could make a significant difference to textile companies in Scotland if they were 
granted preferential access to the market in the USA. 
Imports of cars into the US are subject to a tariff of 2.5%, while the (8¶V tariff on cars is the significantly 
higher rate of 10%. While there is no longer any production of cars in Scotland, TTIP could have a 
beneficial effect on Scottish consumers if imports from the US were not subject to the (8¶V MFN tariff on 
cars. 
Establishing a free-trade area between the EU and US should allow substantially all of their products to 
cross the Atlantic without customs duties. But this is not as straightforward as it sounds and the gains 
from further trade liberalisation may be muted. The issue is to identify where goods are actually 
manufactured. Modern production processes often involve extended global supply chains where 
production takes place in different countries using inputs from a wide range of international sources. 
Hence, what is the ³QDWLRQDOLW\´ of a car that is assembled in England by a Japanese manufacturer using 
parts are manufactured in plants located throughout Europe and the rest of the world? There are few 
modern  goods  that  could  claim  to  be  the  product  of  a  single  country  in  every  respect.  The 
globalisation of manufacturing means that EU products are likely to have inputs from countries outside 
its  28  member  nations  while  production  in  North  America  ±  Canada,  the  US  and  Mexico  ±  is 
heavily integrated through NAFTA. 
If no good can claim to be 100% from a single country, what proportion of its production has to take 
place within the borders of that country in order for it to be deemed to be a product of that nation? The 
EU and the US have to decide upon the minimum domestic content of a product that will allow them to 
treat the good preferentially, letting in imports from each other without charging the MFN tariff. These 
Rules of Origin (ROO) are quite contentious to negotiate and are expensive to monitor. Given the nature 
of  existing  trade  agreements,  all  goods  can  move  freely  across  the  internal  borders  of  the  EU 
regardless of origin, but this is not the case for trade amongst the member countries of NAFTA. Nor will 
it happen even if TTIP successfully eliminates all tariffs on the products of the US and the EU. Customs 
inspection will still be needed to ensure that traded goods meet the ROO and can enter freely or, if they 
do not, are subject to the appropriate MFN tariffs. 
In summary, eliminating the tariffs remaining between the EU and US will bring benefits to consumers 
but, given that the trade taxes are low to start with, the gains will likely be modest. 
IV          TTIP and trade in services 
The (8¶V expressed goals for TTIP with respect to services trade is to ensure that EU firms are able to 
compete in the US on the same terms as US firms, while safeguarding public services. A successful 
agreement from the point of view of the EU would be one that improved access to the US market for EU 
businesses and professionals, achieving mutual recognition of some professional qualifications (such as 
for architects) and enhancing the ability of firms to get licences or formal approval to provide consultancy 
services (accountancy, legal, management consultancy, etc.). This will promote opportunities for suitably 
qualified professionals to enter new markets while ensuring that there is less contagion resulting from 
the activities of underqualified professionals, particularly in the light of the recent financial crisis. 
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Improving access in services is more controversial that liberalising trade in goods. The EU is adamant 
that TTIP will not involve any commitments with respect to the provision of services in sensitive areas, 
such as publicly-funded health, education, or social services. Nor will public authorities be forced to 
outsource public services that are currently produced in-house. Furthermore, EU member states will still 
be free to maintain any restrictions in film, television and radio to protect EU media production. This is 
the area where the details in the final draft treaty will be crucial in determining whether TTIP will bring 
benefits. TPP has already been condemned for promoting the interests of Hollywood to the detriment of 
local cultural industries and there are concerns that service providers in the US will be seeking to 
enhance their position in the EU through TTIP. 
V            TTIP and customs and trade facilitation 
The general goal of this is to streamline customs rules and controls to make exporting easier. This would 
save time and money for all exporters but might have greater impact on some sectors of the economy. 
The task is to avoid unnecessary technical differences between the two markets, which often involves 
determining when standards are actually the same. When they differ, finding commons standards will 
reduce ILUPV¶ costs in selling in foreign markets. There is, indeed, an aspiration that the standards that 
TTIP establishes will become the global norm, giving EU and US firms an advantage in global markets. 
The fear about deepening regulatory cooperation is that the lowest standards will prevail, resulting in a 
detrimental impact on consumers to the advantage of large corporations. Negotiators have tried to re- 
assure the public that EU restrictions on, for example, genetically modified crops and hormone-fed beef 
are not on the table. Once again, the final draft will reveal what compromises have been reached. 
Engineering goods account for around 25% of the bilateral trade volume between the US and the EU. 
This sector is characterised by big differences in technical regulations and the procedures used to check 
that products are in conformance with them. This is a particular problem given that the volumes of 
products traded are relatively small, meaning that the fixed costs of meeting another FRXQWU\¶V standards 
can have a significant impact on the ILUPV¶ average costs of serving the market. Scottish companies, in 
particular, have a big presence in this sector and stand to benefit from successful negotiations that 
establish common standards on both sides of the Atlantic. 
VI          Issues facing SMEs 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are at a particular disadvantage in selling into foreign 
markets. These are firms that employ fewer than 250 staff but account for two-thirds of private-sector 
employment. However, their production levels are generally so small that even small trade costs or 
minor differentials in product standards can create insuperable hurdles to their ability to export. 
TTIP negotiations are attempting to address the problems of SMEs by making progress on removing 
remaining customs duties, simplifying the custom procedures, sorting out differences in technical 
standards, and improving the protection of ILUPV¶ intellectual property rights. 
One goal of the TTIP negotiations is to have the US provide a free, online helpdesk to small firms that 
addresses questions of doing business across the Atlantic. This may sound trivial, but it could be of 
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great significance to small firms that do not enjoy access to the consultants and advisors at the beck and 
call of larger firms (and would mirror a similar facility offered by the EU). 
VII         Conclusions 
Much of the proposed TTIP treaty is uncontroversial in promising to lower the remaining barriers to trade 
in goods and services that prevent consumers from benefitting from the variety of goods and services 
that are available on both sides of the Atlantic. We are looking at two of the ZRUOG¶V largest trading 
partners taking the opportunity to deepen their trading relationship and this should provide dividends to 
firms and consumers on both sides of the Atlantic. It may even have knock-on effects and reinvigorate 
the multilateral negotiations within the WTO. 
For Scotland, TTIP has some clear implications. If successful, TTIP may create opportunities for the 
textile and  engineering sectors  by  way  of  reduced  clothing tariffs  and  an  agreement  on  common 
technical standards. Further trade liberalisation in services may have positive impacts for ScotlaQG¶V 
important  financial  services  sector,  while  any  decrease  in  red-tape  and  other  regulatory  burdens 
may  help more of 6FRWODQG¶V SMEs to enter the US market. However, TTIP will have little or no impact 
on perhaps 6FRWODQG¶V most iconic export, Scotch whisky, given that it already benefits in the US market 
from a zero-rated Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff. 
As noted, the caveats are largely in the realm of the non-traditional areas of trade agreements, where 
TTIP might be used to force the partners to accept standards or behaviours that are unpalatable to their 
citizens. However, the EU is clearly aware of these issues. The question remains as to whether EU 
negotiators are able to provide a sufficiently robust defence of European wishes and values.  
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